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Verification of User Interface Software: The Example
of Use-Related Safety Requirements and
Programmable Medical Devices
Michael D. Harrison , Paolo Masci, Jose´ Creissac Campos, and Paul Curzon
Abstract—One part of demonstrating that a device is acceptably
safe, often required by regulatory standards, is to show that it sat-
isfies a set of requirements known to mitigate hazards. This paper
is concerned with how to demonstrate that a user interface soft-
ware design is compliant with use-related safety requirements. A
methodology is presented based on the use of formal methods tech-
nologies to provide guidance to developers about addressing three
key verification challenges: 1) how to validate a model, and show
that it is a faithful representation of the device; 2) how to formalize
requirements given in natural language, and demonstrate the ben-
efits of the formalization process; and 3) how to prove requirements
of a model using readily available formal verification tools. A model
of a commercial device is used throughout the paper to demonstrate
the methodology. A representative set of requirements are consid-
ered. They are based on US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
draft documentation for programmable medical devices, and on
best practice in user interface design illustrated in relevant inter-
national standards. The methodology aims to demonstrate how to
achieve the FDA’s agenda of using formal methods to support the
approval process for medical devices.
Index Terms—Formal verification, human error, medical
devices, model checking, modal action logic (MAL), performance,
PVS, theorem proving.
I. INTRODUCTION
D ESIGN anomalies in user interface software are an impor-tant concern in safety-critical application domains, includ-
ing aviation, power generation, and medicine. In these domains,
manufacturers are mandated by regulators to ensure that their
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system or device has been developed using best practice, and
that risks associated with the use of their products are minimal
or “as low as reasonably practicable”. This must be done be-
fore the system or device can be deployed in a safety critical
context. Such a demonstration usually includes “proof” that the
device satisfies a set of safety requirements designed to mitigate
identified hazards (see [1]). The US Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) has produced one such set of requirements in draft
documentation [2] focusing on programmable medical devices,
particularly infusion pumps.
This paper is concerned with how to demonstrate that a soft-
ware design is compliant with use-related requirements. FDA
guidelines propose that such a demonstration is “highly depen-
dent upon comprehensive software testing, inspections, analy-
ses and other verification tasks performed at each stage of the
software development cycle” [3]. The data produced for such
analysis is usually substantial and does not prove the absence of
compliance breaches.
Formal techniques provide additional information. They are
concise, precise, and exhaustive, and can be applied before a
complete implementation is available. Using formal techniques
for the analysis of a system design involves two main steps. The
first step is to develop a formal (i.e., mathematical) model of
the device that captures relevant characteristics and functional-
ities of the system. The second step is to use mechanized tools
to perform a systematic analysis of the developed model, to
check that the behaviors described in the model comply with
relevant requirements. If the model correctly represents the real
system, then requirements proved of the model apply also to
the real system. Formal techniques provide information when
the analysis of a requirement fails. This information, typically
captured in a counter-example, identifies a precise scenario in
which design aspects of the device can violate the constraints
imposed by the requirements being analyzed. Developers can
use counter-examples constructively, to explore the significance
of the failure, and decide whether redesign is necessary or other
factors or processes can be taken into account to mitigate the
identified failure.
Three types of formal techniques are used in this work to
analyze the user interface software of an interactive system:
model checking, theorem proving, and simulation.
1) Model checking is used to validate models and analyze
the interface mode behavior of the device against relevant
safety requirements. This verification technology focuses
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on state transition systems. By exploring the state space of
the transition system exhaustively, developers can check
automatically whether a requirement is true of the model.
The ingenuity in model checking is to build abstract mod-
els whose complexity can be handled by the analysis tools,
and to formulate the requirements appropriately.
2) Theorem proving is used for the analysis of detailed mod-
els of the device that cannot be analyzed efficiently using
model checking. The verification technology is based on
natural deduction, and is concerned with resolving logic
problems by mechanized application of inference rules.
Arbitrarily complex models and requirements can be han-
dled. However, proof of requirements is usually not fully
automatic, and guidance from the analyst may be required.
3) Simulation is used throughout the analysis process to val-
idate a developed model against the real system. The
specific type of simulation technology adopted in the
present work involves the use of executable formal mod-
els and prototyping. The detailed formal models guide the
behavior of interactive prototypes whose features and
characteristics closely resemble those of the real system.
These prototypes can be used by domain experts to check
whether the formal model mimics the behavior of the real
device, and by human factors specialists to discuss use-
related requirements with engineers and formal methods
experts. Formal methods experts can demonstrate results
obtained using model checking or theorem proving in a
way that is accessible to the other team members. Fi-
nally, engineers can explore alternative design solutions
at reduced cost. This process is fundamental in human-
centered design processes carried out by a multidisci-
plinary team of developers [4].
To date, little or no guidance has been produced to demon-
strate how to use formal methods technologies for the analysis of
user interface software. As a result, formal verification of usabil-
ity aspects have seen slow take-up in industry. We address this
challenge, providing software developers with a demonstration
of how formal techniques can be used to gain high assurance that
user interface software design is compliant with given require-
ments, while also considering how software engineers, domain
experts, and human factors experts can collaborate to ensure that
the manner in which the requirements are satisfied will mitigate
use-error.
A. Contribution
We present a methodology that can be used as guidance by
developers when applying formal methods technologies to the
analysis of user interface software against use-related require-
ments. The paper describes the steps taken to demonstrate that
the requirements are satisfied. This includes demonstrating that
1) the model correctly describes the interactive behavior of
the device;
2) requirements given in natural language are correctly trans-
lated into formal properties of the model;
3) the model satisfies the formal properties, and
4) the consequence of failure, if there is failure, is considered
leading either to redesign of the device, modification of
the property, or changes to the overall system to mitigate
against the failure.
A case study based on a commercial infusion pump is used
to illustrate the methodology.
We progress an agenda suggested by the FDA’s use of formal
techniques [5]. However, whether the analysis is feasible in the
organizations that develop medical devices is an important con-
sideration, and this challenge is part of the paper’s discussion.
B. Organization
Section II sets the work described in the paper in context, dis-
cussing related work and scoping what is achieved. Section III
describes the methodology adopted for the formal analysis of
user interface software design. Section IV illustrates the user
interface features of the medical device. Section V illustrates
the two forms of the model that were developed. Section VI
discusses how the models were validated against the actual de-
vice. Section VII describes the requirements and indicates how
theorems representing the requirements were proved. Finally,
Section VIII provides discussion and conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
Other work shares similar concerns with this paper about how
to verify use-related requirements. Bolton et al. [6] use models
of user tasks as a basis for generating properties for verification,
while in [7] a set of patterns that embody usability principles
are proposed. Bolton and Bass [8], [9] used SAL [10] to an-
alyze related properties of the Baxter iPump. They translate
formal representations of normative tasks into properties that
can be checked on a model of the pump user interface. They
also analyze the normative tasks systematically to identify po-
tentially erroneous sequences. Example tasks include turning
the pump ON and OFF, stopping the infusion, and entering a
volume to be infused. Their papers include detailed discussion
of the challenges faced when modeling and analyzing a real-
istic system model with a model checker. Mori et al. [11] and
Fields [12] also represent tasks in a formal language and use a
model checker to analyze tasks. Berstel et al. [13] use a formal
notation to model and analyze WIMP style interfaces.
Bowen and Reeves have produced some initial proposals for
design patterns for modeling user interfaces [14], for example
the callback pattern, representing the behavior of confirmation
dialogs used to confirm user operations and the binary choice
pattern, representing the behavior of input dialogs used to ac-
quire data from the user. These patterns address use-related
design issues. Their utility is orthogonal to our approach, as
they focus on best modeling practice for user interface software
models, rather than verification of given safety requirements.
Most previous research, relating to the formal verification
of safety requirements has been devoted to the analysis of the
control part of a system, rather than to the human-machine in-
terface. For example, a set of FDA safety requirements was
also formalized in [15] using the UPPAAL [16] model checker.
Their analysis focuses on design aspects of the controller of the
pump rather than user interface design and use-related require-
ments. Li et al. [17] have developed verification patterns that
can be used for the analysis of safety interlock mechanisms in
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interoperable medical devices. Although they use the patterns to
analyze use-related properties such as “When the laser scalpel
emits laser, the patient’s trachea oxygen level must not exceed
a threshold ΘO2 ” the aim is the integration of a model checker
in the actual implementation of the safety interlock as a runtime
fault prevention mechanism, rather than the analysis of use-
related aspects of the safety interlock. This and other similar
research activities, e.g., [18]–[20], are not concerned with the
analysis of use-related requirements. Proving requirements with
similar characteristics to those described in this paper (though
not explicitly use-related) has been the focus of a mature set
of tools developed by Heitmeyer’s team using SCR [21]. Their
approach uses a tabular notation to describe requirements which
makes the technique relatively acceptable to developers.
Combining simulation with model checking, as discussed in
Section III when validating the model, has also been a focus in,
for example, [22]–[24]. Recent work concerned with simula-
tions of PVS specifications has been used to support the specific
modeling process described in this paper with simulation [25].
While the present paper takes an existing device as its start-
ing point, this must be seen in the context of work that uses
formal specifications as part of the design process. Tools such
as Event B [26] have been developed with such a goal in mind.
With Event B, an initial model is first developed that specifies the
device characteristics and incorporates the safety requirements.
This model is gradually refined using details about how specific
functionalities are implemented. Bowen and Reeves [27] have
presented a similar refinement approach for user interface de-
sign. Their work specifically targets the design of user interface
layouts. Presentation interaction models are used to describe
the user interface layout in terms of its component widgets. A
mixture of formal and informal refinement is used to transform
the initial specification into its implementation.
III. MODELING AND ANALYSIS APPROACH
The process of proving regulatory requirements described in
this paper involves a sequence of steps. These are as follows.
1) Developing a model of the user interface: This model cap-
tures the states of the device’s user interface, the available
user and internal actions, and how these change the de-
vice’s state. These models are expressed as state machines.
The concrete choice of modeling language depends on the
type of formal user interface analysis to be carried out.
2) Validating the model: This is done using both model
checking and simulation. The validation process involves
generating witnesses for properties p that should be true
of the device. This is done by creating invalid assertions
in the form always not p, and using the model checker
to find counter-examples for these invalid assertions. The
generated counter-examples are witnesses for property
p, in the sense that they identify sequences of actions
that satisfy p. These sequences can be compared with
logs from the actual device, to assess the plausibility of
the identified actions and device behaviors. This tech-
nique is similar to that used in [28] for generating test
cases. Simulation of the model provides an opportunity for
analysts who are not formal methods experts to explore
the behavior of the user interface interactively. This en-
ables verification that the model reflects the design of the
real system, or discussion of the significance of a given re-
quirement. Whether model checking or simulation is used
as validation methodology depends on the analyst (e.g.,
formal methods experts are likely to prefer model check-
ing), and the model (e.g., complex models may exceed the
capabilities of model checking tools, therefore, simulation
is the only option). Concrete examples are discussed in
Section VI.
3) Formalizing the requirements: This involves two stages.
The first disambiguates the requirements so that they can
be translated more easily into a device-specific property.
This is described in more detail in [29]. These precise
requirements are designed to be implementation indepen-
dent, and can be used over a range of devices. The second
stage involves refining each formalized requirement so
that it is specifically about the device under analysis. Both
stages are typically interactive and can involve discussion
with both human factors specialists, checking the validity
of the interpretation of the requirement, and regulator to
check that the spirit of the original requirement is correctly
captured by the developed property.
4) Proving the formalized requirements: The property repre-
senting the formalized requirement is proved of the model
by model checking or theorem proving. In the example,
all the formalized requirements were proved using both
technologies except those that involve full number en-
try, which could only be proved efficiently using theorem
proving.
5) Iterating the process: The steps of the analysis process
may be iterated as the model is successively refined or may
trigger the generation of arguments as to why the design,
as modeled, satisfies or fails to satisfy the requirements.
Whilst the described process assumes a model-based view of
development, the same methodology can also be applied retro-
spectively to existing devices. For already developed devices,
the process of building the model involves reverse engineering
the device implementation. A white box view of the system
may be taken by reverse engineering the code, or a black box
view of the system can be developed by modeling the system
based on user manuals and experience of the device itself. In
this paper, this retrospective application of the methodology
has been used to perform the analysis of the example medical
device.
IV. MEDICAL EXAMPLE
Intravenous infusion pumps are used in many contexts in
hospitals, for example intensive care and oncology. They are
designed to infuse prescribed doses of medication intravenously
over specified periods of time. Use error is a particular concern
in such devices. Nurses program them, often under pressure,
from paper prescriptions provided by doctors or pharmacies.
The format of prescriptions can vary in terms of presentation,
legibility, units used, and whether the prescription focuses on
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Fig. 1. Actions and attributes used to model the pump. Actions define func-
tionalities provided by the device to enable user interaction (e.g., the fup key)
and to handle device internal events (e.g., a function for handling alarms). At-
tributes define the characteristics of display elements used to present feedback to
the user (e.g., the top-line display), as well as internal state variables necessary
to represent the device behavior.
volume and rate, or volume and time—two alternative ways of
describing a prescription. The chosen device (see Fig. 1) is an
existing commercial product [30] that has characteristics that
are common to many devices that control processes over time.
The clinician user sets infusion pump parameters and monitors
the infusion process using the device. The values and settings
can be changed using a combination of function and chevron
keys (see Fig. 1). Chevron keys are used to increase (using
specified actions fup or sup), or decrease (using fdown or sdown),
entered numbers incrementally. Holding the chevron key down
accelerates the size of the increment or decrement.
Because the device is small it is reliant on modes to make
effective use of the screen and available action keys. The mode
structure first distinguishes whether the device is infusing (i.e.,
pumping medication into the patient) or holding (i.e., paused).
Additional modes are offered by the device for changing ther-
apy settings and pump configuration options. For example, data
entry modes govern whether the chevron keys change infusion
rate, vtbi, or time, or alternatively allow the user to move be-
tween options in a menu. Menus are available to select prede-
fined settings in bag mode and in query mode. Bag mode allows
the user to select from a set of infusion bag options, thereby
setting vtbi to a predetermined value. Query mode, invoked by
the query button, generates a menu of options configured by
the manufacturer. Options include locking the infusion rate, dis-
abling the locking of it, setting vtbi and time rather than vtbi
and infusion rate, and changing the units of volume and infusion
rate. The device allows movement between display modes via
three function keys (key1, key2, and key3). Each function key
has a display associated with it indicating its present function
(fndisp1, fndisp2, and fndisp3).
In the analysis of the requirements that follows, further details
of the device and modes will be provided as necessary, partic-
ularly when the analysis of a requirement leads to interesting
consequences.
V. DEVELOPING A MODEL OF THE DEVICE
Neither a process of developing and refining models satis-
fying requirements nor producing models from program code
was feasible in the present case. The device had already been
developed, and the program code was not available to us. The
model was therefore developed by hand using a combination of
user manuals, simulations and the device itself.
At the stage of the analysis described in this paper, a model
of the particular pump had already been developed as part of
a general analysis of usability properties of the device [31],
and without the particular FDA requirements considered in the
present paper in mind. It had been used to analyze properties
of the interactive modes, such as whether device modes were
presented by the device without ambiguity. This initial model
was analyzed using the NuSMV model checking tool [32].
This model was further extended to facilitate analysis of the
number entry system of the device as required to prove various
FDA requirements. One effect of this extension was that the
size of the model increased significantly, making the use of the
NuSMV model checker infeasible. We, therefore, changed ver-
ification technology when analyzing the extended model. Our
option was theorem proving, which is less automated than model
checking, but can handle the analysis of more complex models
(compare [8]). The specific theorem prover is PVS [33], which
offers an expressive specification language that made it easy
to translate and extend the initial model. NuSMV uses sym-
bolic model checking. Alternative model checking technologies
exist (e.g., bounded model checking), also available within the
NuSMV toolset, that might have been able to analyze efficiently
the extended model for the considered properties, possibly at
the expense of completeness. Another key reason for the adop-
tion of PVS was its ability to generate the prototypes that en-
abled validation of the model and broader discussion of the
requirements.
A. Initial Model of the Device
The model of the device has two main elements: a generic
“pump” component modeling the pumping mechanism con-
trolled by the device and an “interface” component that is spe-
cific to the particular user interface of the device. The pump
component has been reused in other models. For example, an
infusion pump developed by another manufacturer has also been
studied in detail in [31] which uses this component. The initial
model focused on features of the device that involved interac-
tion with the user. This model used the underlying pump process
but focused on the effect of actions insofar as they change the
basic modes of the device (infusing, paused, off), the interaction
modes of the device and the information that is displayed.
To ease the modeling process, a first order notation oriented
around actions was used to describe user actions that were pro-
vided by the infusion pump. The notation that was used [modal
action logic (MAL)], and its mapping to SMV and analysis us-
ing NuSMV is supported by the IVY tool [7], [34]. MAL is
a simple state transition language, easily translated from state
transition diagrams or the SCR tabular format [21]. The notation
is used because it is of a type that is more readily acceptable
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Fig. 2. Simulating the PVS model of the pump.
by developers, making the actions and state transitions explicit
in their description. The properties that translate the require-
ments are expressed in Temporal Logic. Both CTL and LTL
logics (see [35]) are supported by IVY and NuSMV. LTL model
checking is implemented by NuSMV in terms of CTL model
checking, and is typically less efficient [36]. In practice, CTL
is used unless the property can only be expressed in LTL. To
facilitate tractability using model checking, token values were
used for the pump variables vtbi, infusion rate, time, and volume
infused. They were assumed to be integers in the range [0 . . . 7].
These simplifications were considered to be valid when limiting
the analysis to the modal behavior of the device.
The following MAL modal axiom describes the conditions
in which key1 (see Fig. 1) has the effect of confirming a device
reset (Fig. 2 shows the pump display at this step).
topline = clearsetup → [key1]
topline′=holding & middisp[drate]′ &
middisp[dvtbi]′ & !middisp[dtime]′ &
middisp[dvol]′ & !middisp[dbags]′ &
!middisp[dquery]′ & !middisp[dkvorate]′ &
fndisp1′=fvol & fndisp2′=fvtbi &
fndisp3′=fnull & entrymode′=rmode &
effect(device.reset) & keep(bagscursor, rlock)
This axiom describes (after [key1]) the effect of action key1.
The expression to the left of the action, namely (topline =
clearsetup), states the condition under which the behavior de-
scribed for the action is enabled. This specifies that when the top
line of the display shows “clear setup,” and the action is invoked,
then the expression after [key1] describes the behavior. The rule
describes changes to visible attributes middisp, topline, fndisp1,
fndisp2, and fndisp3. The priming of an attribute (topline′, for
example) indicates that the action changes the value of that at-
tribute. The action key1 also changes the mode of the device
(entrymode) to allow entry of infusion rate (rmode). Finally,
the rule describes how the action further invokes an action in
the pump component (device.reset) that initializes all the pump
variables. The action reset is accessed in the reusable pump
component by using the pump′s identifier device in the MAL
specification. The keep(...) expression specifies which attributes
are not affected by the action and remain unchanged.
This example shows how the MAL model focuses on interface
features and the modes of the device, describing concretely how
actions change the display and modes of the device. It has a
simple discrete model of time. An action tick increments time
as the infusion process continues, or while the device is paused.
In the latter case the value of time is used to determine how long
the pause has been. This model, even without full number entry,
requires substantial processing for analysis in NuSMV, around
90 min for the subset of properties that are tractable. The analysis
was performed on an Apple MacBook Pro 2.9 GHz Intel core
i5 with 8 GB of RAM. A detailed discussion of the challenges
related to model checking realistic user interface models can be
found in [8].
B. Detailed Model of the Device
The second model of the device, which includes additional
details needed for the analysis of various FDA requirements,
was developed by translating the MAL systematically into the
PVS [33] theorem proving system, and then extending it with
details related to the data entry system. PVS allows the analy-
sis, in principle, of models and properties involving infinitely
many states. The equivalent specification for the MAL fragment
described in the previous section is
key1_case_clearsetup(st: (per_key1)):
state = st WITH [ topline := holding,
middisp := LAMBDA
(x: imid_type):
(x = drate) OR
(x = dvtbi) OR
(x = dvol),
device := reset(device(st)),
fndisp1 := fvol,
fndisp2 := fvtbi,
fndisp3 := fnull,
entrymode := rmode ]
The PVS theory captures all the characteristics of the MAL
model, including time, but also includes a full number entry
model and other specific details. The PVS features that corre-
spond to MAL elements can be seen in the specification. This
function key1_case_clearsetup is invoked in the more
general key1 function when the condition topline(st) =
clearsetup is true. The function has domain (per_key1),
where per_key1 is a predicate that restricts the function do-
main to the set of states for which the action is accessible to the
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user. This information is used by PVS to ensure well-formedness
of the model.
VI. VALIDATING THE MODEL AGAINST THE REAL DEVICE
Fidelity of the model to the implemented device was first
demonstrated using the NuSMV [32] model checker by proving
a range of properties. This validation of the model inevitably
included state abstractions required to reduce the state space
for the model checking analysis. The sequences generated as
witnesses provided structural details such as a sequence of mode
transitions, rather than the details of entry of a particular value
for the infusion rate.
NuSMV accepts a finite state model (translated from the MAL
model illustrated above) and analyzes it exhaustively to prove
or disprove a property. An example of such a property is that,
once relevant pump variables had been entered, infusion would
lead to a state in which the volume infused was equal to the
entered vtbi:
AG(device.infusionrate = 1 & device.vtbi = 7
⇒ AG(device.volumeinfused != 7))
The property is expressed as a negation. It asserts that it is
always the case, for all paths, that if infusion rate is set to 1 (a
token value) and vtbi is set to 7, then a state cannot be reached
in which volume infused is 7. This particular property is generic
in the sense that it would be a desirable characteristic of any
programmable infusion pump. It does not depend on the details
of the device user interface, depending only on the generic
pump model, but produces results that enable an analysis of the
interface, making possible a comparison between alternative
interfaces. As expected, the property fails when checked and
produces a trace of steps (a witness) in which the infusion rate
is set to 1 and vtbi is set to 7. It indicates that once this has
happened, eventually the device is set to infuse, and then after
more steps a state is reached where the volume that has been
infused becomes 7. The trace can be compared with the actual
device logs.
This model was used to validate a set of plausibility prop-
erties before translating it into the fuller PVS model. For each
action specified in the first model, a function was described that
transformed PVS descriptions of states, and for each permis-
sion describing when the action was enabled, a PVS predicate
was produced. Texture was then added to provide a more de-
tailed description of the user interface behavior, in particular
related to the data entry system of the pump. A set of informal
rules were used to achieve this translation. The correctness pre-
serving properties of the translation were not however checked
formally. A prototype was also produced automatically from the
PVS model to obtain an interactive simulation with the “look
and feel” of the actual device (see Fig. 2). The traces and simu-
lations were indistinguishable from the behavior of the physical
device. The only difference between the logs and traces obtained
in the simulation and those of the real device was that the pre-
cise timings differed. The simulations were generated with the
aim that they could be explored by regulator, manufacturer or
for training purposes by the user. These simulations only allow,
of course, an exploration of the paths that the user (for exam-
ple, regulator) chooses to explore. Simulation can also be used
to illustrate what the failure of a property means. Part of the
argument that a failure is acceptable may then involve a demon-
stration of the features of the device that fail the requirement,
showing that they do not present a risk. Validation of the PVS
model was checked in this case not by proving the equivalence
of the PVS and MAL models, though this is feasible, but by
simulating the PVS model using PVSio-web [37]. Both MAL
sequences and PVSio-web simulations were explored by hand
with the help of expert users and the user manual of the real
device.
The remainder of the present paper focuses on the PVS model
and the theorems that were generated to prove use-related re-
quirements. Relevant snippets of the developed models and
theorems will be presented. The full MAL model with CTL
properties, and the full PVS theory and theorems with proofs
can be found in the specification repository.1 All proofs can be
reinvoked using the IVY and PVS tools.
VII. FORMALIZING AND PROVING REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we demonstrate how the process of formalizing
and proving use-related safety requirements can encourage a
constructive dialog between the analyst and the other experts
involved in the development of a user interface.
The developed device model was used to analyze two small
but representative sets of requirements. The FDA requirements
described in [5] are considered first. They are designed to mit-
igate use hazards that could lead to misprogramming of the in-
fusion pump and, consequently, delayed therapy or even patient
harm. A further set of requirements is then considered based
on the property templates described in [38] and [39]. These
additional requirements capture best practice in user interface
design. Note that, whilst the process is demonstrated for a spe-
cific device, the applicability of the methodology is general, and
can help design better user interfaces.
A. Formalization Process
To formalize the requirements given in natural language, it
is necessary to consider their precise interpretations (see [29]).
A way to develop a precise interpretation is to translate the re-
quirements into logic properties. These properties are expressed
using the PVS language, which combines a functional notation,
similar to that used in programming languages, with logic con-
nectives such asAND (conjunction),OR (disjunction),IMPLIES
(implication). Precision is achieved by defining abstractions that
can be more readily understood by different stakeholders. Also,
this process makes it easier to construct properties that match
the requirements as PVS theorems. The formalization must cap-
ture the essence of the requirements as understood both by the
regulator, who developed them in the first place, and the human
factors specialists, who can comment on the user aspects of
the requirements and whether they are fulfilled by the specific
properties of the device.
1http://hcispecs.di.uminho.pt/m/2
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B. FDA Requirements
The FDA requirements are specific to the safety of infu-
sion pumps. For each requirement, the following information
is presented: the original formulation described in FDA docu-
mentation, the safety concerns addressed by the requirement,
a formalization of the requirement, and a proof of compliance
with the requirement for the example device.
R1: Clearing the pump settings and resetting of the pump
shall require confirmation.
Safety concerns: This requirement is designed to check
whether there is a barrier (in this case confirmation) to reduce
the risk that infusion settings will be cleared or will revert to
predefined settings inadvertently.
Formalization: To formalize this requirement, a logic prop-
erty needs to be constructed that requires that relevant pump
variables are not cleared until a confirm_action has oc-
curred. The property needs to specify also that no other action
(no_confirm) will change the specified pump variables. For
the sake of clarity, the formalization is described for each pump
variable separately. The requirement, for pump variable vtbi,
can be expressed as follows:
ready_to_clear(vtbi)(st) IMPLIES
(clear_setting(vtbi)(st) = x AND
confirm_action(clear_setting(vtbi)
(st)) = 0
AND no_confirm(clear_setting(vtbi)
(st)) = x)
In the above formula,ready_to_clear(vtbi) is a pred-
icate that identifies the states in which the device is ready to clear
the vtbi value. The action clear_setting(vtbi) specifies
the first step, prior to possible confirmation, in which the set-
tings are cleared. This action does not clear the setting itself but
must precede the confirmation action.
Interpretation for the specific pump: The process of further
refining the terms in the abstract property is valuable in reach-
ing agreement about how the requirement applies to the spe-
cific pump. It leads to consideration as to what, for example,
should be the state of the device when it is “ready to clear”
and how the state of the device should be communicated to
the user. Further, it leads to consideration of what the confir-
mation should be and how it should be signaled to the user.
The actions captured by no_confirm are also a matter of
concern, as they define what actions should be permitted to
abandon the clearing of the setting. For example, in the ex-
ample device, vtbi can be cleared when the device is turned
on and is in the holding state. The action of clearing the pump
variable is only possible if its value is nonzero. Relevant state at-
tributes for expressing whether the pump is infusing and turned
on are infusing? and powered_on, respectively. Predicate
ready_to_clear can therefore be expressed as
ready_to_clear(vtbi)(st) =
NOT device(st) ‘infusing? AND
device(st)‘powered_on? AND
device(st)‘vtbi = x AND x /= 0
where x is a parameter representing a generic, but given, vtbi
value. Normally, a specification of ready_to_clear is nec-
essary that includes visual attributes of the user interface. For
example, in this case the device should be ready to clear unless
the top line of the display indicates that it is infusing. It was felt
unnecessary however to include this in the formulation—other
requirements were considered in the analysis that demonstrate
the visibility within the user interface of operating modes. The
required clearing of the pump variables is achieved by switch-
ing the pump off and then switching it back on again. When
the settings are cleared in this way, as the device is switched
back on, a request is made for confirmation. This confirmation
can be given by the user through action key1. The request for
confirmation is indicated by a top line display of “clear setup.”
Proving the requirement: The requirement can be proved in
PVS with no human intervention by using the predefined proof
strategy grind (which performs quantifier elimination, expan-
sion of definitions, and propositional simplification) to prove
each subgoal.
R2: The pump shall issue an alert if paused for more than t
minutes.
Safety concerns: This requirement aims to ensure that the
user is alerted if the device is left unattended.
Formalization: The requirement can be formalized using a
predicate user_input_strictly_overdue, which indi-
cates whether the device has been paused without activity for
a specified period, and a predicate alert, which describes an
appropriate alert produced by the device:
user_input_strictly_overdue(st)
IMPLIES alert(st)
Interpretation for the specific pump: The generic formulation
can be refined to capture specific scenarios relevant for the
device, for example if the device is left unattended when paused.
In this case, predicate user_input_strictly_overdue
can be expressed in more detail as
user_input_strictly_overdue(st) =
paused(st) AND elapsed(st) > timeout
where paused and elapsed will have specific meanings for
the particular infusion pump. In this case, the pump is paused
when the device is powered on and not infusing:
pause(st) = device(st)‘powered_on? AND
NOT device(st)‘infusing?
Attribute elapse specifies the time since the device was
last used when in holding mode. This attribute is incremented
each tick action (which simulates the evolution of time in the
developed model) when the device is paused.
Proving the requirement: This requirement can be proved for
all reachable states through structural induction. That is, the PVS
theorem contains the following two parts: the first part proves
that the formalized requirement (denoted as R2assertion in
the theorem) is true of the initial device state and the second part
proves that, given a generic state pre for which the requirement
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is true, it is always the case that the requirement is also true for
any state post reached from pre by any available action:
R2: THEOREM
FORALL (pre, post: state):
(init?(pre) IMPLIES R2assertion(pre))
AND
(R2assertion(pre) AND
state_transitions(pre, post)
IMPLIES
R2assertion(post))
In the theorem, predicate state_transitions is used as
a means to relate states st1 to st2 if st2 can be reached by
any available action from st1. This requirement can be proved
in PVS by splitting the theorem into subgoals based on the
available actions, and then using grind to complete the proof
of each subgoal.
R3: If the pump is in a state where user input is required,
the pump shall issue periodic alerts/indications every t minutes
until the required input is provided.
Safety concerns: This requirement aims to mitigate situations
where the clinician has entered incomplete infusion parameters.
This might occur, for example, if the clinician is interrupted
while programming the device.
Formalization: The formalized requirement includes the fol-
lowing elements: alert, a predicate describing an appropriate
alert produced by the device; ready, a predicate identifying the
device state before the alert was issued; and user_confirm,
an action that clears the alert:
user_input_strictly_overdue(st) IMPLIES
(alert(st) AND ready(user_confirm(st)))
Interpretation for the specific pump: Providing an interpre-
tation for these abstract terms challenges the designer and the
human factors specialist to consider the features of the design
that need to be considered in the requirement. For example,
user_input_strictly_overdue should be true when
the device has been paused without activity for a specified period
(compare requirement R2). The formalization also challenges
the analysis team to consider how this device state is communi-
cated to the user, and which key is used as confirmation key. In
the specific pump, alert is indicated by an appropriate top line
display (attention) which is characterized also by an audi-
ble alarm. Action user_confirm is defined as key3. Note
that the confirm does nothing if key3 is not enabled. Finally,
predicate ready needs to be defined. It checks that the device
returns to a pause state and the elapsed time is set to a value less
than the time out.
Proving the requirement: This requirement can be proved
in PVS with minimal human intervention, using a structural
induction similar to the previous example.
R4: The flow rate for the pump shall be programmable.
Safety concerns: This requirement aims to ensure that the
clinician can program the pump with the flow rate values indi-
cated in the prescription provided by the pharmacy.
Formalization: This requirement is more challenging to make
precise. It requires a description of what is meant by “pro-
grammable” in this context. The requirement is designed to
ensure that any flow rate value indicated in a prescription can
be programmed in the pump. A reasonable interpretation is that
there is always an available action (when in a relevant mode)
that will change the flow rate programmed in the pump so that
it is closer to the target rate. The requirement can be reformu-
lated therefore as follows: “If the device is ready to enter the
flow rate, then there is always an action that will take the flow
rate closer to the expected rate, and eventually the intended rate
will be reached.” This reformulation can be translated into the
following logic property:
entry_ready(rate)(st) AND
(rate(st) > e IMPLIES
rate(st) - e >= rate(a1(st)) - e) AND
(rate(st) < e IMPLIES
e - rate(st) >= e - rate(a2(st)))
where e is a target value for the flow rate, a1 is an action that
reduces the rate, and a2 is an action that increases the rate.
Interpretation for the specific pump: This requirement, as ex-
pressed, raises questions about the nature of the actions a1 and
a2, how the target rate is made visible to the user, and how the
device indicates the progress that is being made to reaching it.
For the specific pump, the device is ready to accept a rate value
(rate_entry_ready) when: the device is switched on, infu-
sion rate is not locked, and the top line display shows “holding”
or “infusing.” The two actions that provide the expected pro-
grammability are single chevron up (sup) and single chevron
down (sdown). Note that the requirement is not concerned with
how efficient the programmability is. Rather it aims to check
that there exists a sequence of actions for entering a given value.
A separate requirement needs to be defined to address efficiency
of programming.
Proving requirement R4: The PVS prover completes the proof
of this theorem unaided, using grind.
R5: To avoid accidental tampering of the infusion pump’s
settings such as flow rate/vtbi, at least two steps should be
required to change the setting.
Safety concerns: This requirement is designed to mitigate
hazards resulting from accidental tampering of pump settings,
as a result for example of a single erroneous button click.
Formalization: This requirement is useful to further illustrate
the role of abstraction as a means of communication with dif-
ferent stakeholders. Whilst this requirement shares similarities
with requirement R1, it is interesting to note the different safety
mechanism indicated in the requirement: R1 requires a “confir-
mation action”; R5 requires “at least two steps.” This is done
intentionally, because a confirmation action can be performed
automatically by the user without further thought, e.g., after
a timeout. In R5, the requirement is that two user actions are
performed—a safety mechanism based on timeouts can be eas-
ily defeated in the case of accidental key presses. To ease the
formalization, the requirement can be reformulated as follows:
“For any value x of a given pump setting, if data entry is ready
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(vtbi_entry_ready) for that pump setting (in this example
vtbi), then the pump setting cannot be updated to x in a single
step.” This property needs to be proved for all possible actions
(state_transitions_xkey1) with the exception of key1
which does update the pump setting:
(vtbi_entry_ready(pre) AND
vtbi_value(pre) = x AND
newvtbi(pre) /= x AND
state_transitions_xkey1(pre, post))
IMPLIES vtbi_value(post) = x
Interpretation for the specific pump: The example pump is
ready to accept a vtbi value when the pump is turned on and
in a relevant data entry mode. Specifically, the top line display
needs to be either dispvtbi (i.e., when entering vtbi and rate)
or vtbitime (i.e., when entering vtbi and time).
Proving the requirement: PVS is able to prove the require-
ment unaided for vtbi and time, using grind. For infusion rate,
on the other hand, the requirement fails. Based on the counter-
example provided by PVS, it can be shown that the requirement
can be satisfied for the infusion rate only if it is assumed that
the clinician always locks the rate before starting the infusion.
Whilst there is always a reminder to lock the rate when starting
the infusion, the assumption needs to be validated against clini-
cal practice adopted in the hospital within which the pump is to
be used.
C. Requirements From Property Templates
The second route to generating use-centred safety require-
ments is to adopt a set of property templates based on usability
design principles. The templates are designed to help developers
to construct requirements appropriate to the analysis of user in-
terface features. They can be instantiated to the particular details
of the device, and provide indications of how to develop user
interfaces that are easier to use and promote more transparency
of the effect of actions.
Three property templates will be used to illustrate the ap-
proach: “feedback,” “consistency,” and “reversibility.” Further
property templates and detailed examples can be found in [39].
D. Feedback Template
When certain important actions are taken, a user needs to be
aware of whether the resulting device status is appropriate or
problematic [40]. Feedback can be considered conveniently as
action feedback, requiring that an action always has an effect that
is visible to the user, and state feedback, requiring that a change
in the state (usually specific attributes of the state rather than the
whole state) is visible to the user. Two example requirements
are now illustrated that are based on this template.
R6: Whenever a pump variable is being entered, the variable
should be clearly identified and its current value visible to the
user.
The instantiation of the general form of action feedback (as
described in [39]) requires that entry of the relevant variable is
enabled (i.e., the device is in the appropriate data entry mode),
and that the variable relevant to the mode is visible. This re-
quirement can be formalized as follows:
entry_ready(entrymode)(st) IMPLIES
visible_variable(mode)(st)
Proving the requirement: The requirement can be proved au-
tomatically in PVS for all reachable states through structural
induction (compare requirement R2).
R7: The current mode should be clearly identified, and
changes in mode should have perceivable feedback.
This requirement is an example of state feedback. It requires
that, in any situation, if the mode changes then the mode is
visible. For the considered pump, top line is the indicator of the
entry mode. The formulation can be further refined therefore
as follows: “When the entry mode changes then the top line
changes.” The requirement expressed as logic formula is
entrymode(pre) /= entrymode(post) IMPLIES
topline(pre) /= topline(post)
Proving the requirement: The proof of this requirement il-
lustrates the type of human intervention that is necessary to
complete an interactive proof attempt. The theorem prover fails
to prove the theorem, and generates a first counter-example
at the point of failure when the device is in bag mode, which
allows standard bag volumes to be assigned to vtbi. The counter-
example shows that
1) the top line indicates “volume to be infused,”
2) action key1 can be used to exit the mode, and
3) the new mode, after performing action key1, has a top
line which also indicates “volume to be infused”, but in
this mode chevron keys change the value of vtbi through
up and down adjustments rather than by navigating the
infusion bag menu.
The fact that the prover identifies this counter-example leads
the analyst, along with domain and human factors experts, to
consider whether this ambiguity is likely to be an issue. Further
discussion might suggest that the format of the display as a
whole between the two modes is significantly different, and
therefore enough to prevent mode confusion. This case can be
therefore excluded by introducing the following guard in the
theorem:
entrymode(pre) /= bagmode
When the proof is attempted again with the guard, the the-
orem prover throws up another similar situation for another
data entry mode, where a top line “vtbi over time” is displayed
in two different modes. As in the previous case, this counter-
example can be considered a false positive because the overall
format of the two displays is significantly different. An addi-
tional guard is therefore added to the theorem to exclude this new
situation:
entrymode(pre) /= ttmode
This further refinement of the theorem is sufficient to com-
plete the proof of the requirement.
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E. Consistency Template
Users quickly develop a mental model that embodies their
expectations of how to interact with a user interface. Because
of this, the overall structure of a user interface should be con-
sistent in its layout, screen structure, navigation, terminology,
and control elements [40]. The consistency template is formu-
lated as a property of a group of actions, or it may be the same
action under different modes, requiring that all actions in the
group have similar effects on specific state attributes. The fol-
lowing requirement for example can be constructed based on
this template.
R8: When entering numbers, a given action will always con-
firm the value entered.
This requirement aims to check that the same key can be
used across different data entry modes to confirm user input.
A general formulation of the requirement includes the follow-
ing elements: a predicate guard_em_ok restricts the set of
relevant entry modes where a given confirmation action con-
firm is available; predicate temp_em_filter extracts the
state attributes that have been changed “temporarily” because of
the mode; and predicate real_em_filter extracts the state
attributes that are changed as a result of exiting from the mode.
All predicates have device data entry mode em as parameter, as
the precise definition of the predicates depends on the data entry
mode in the general case.
guard_em_ok(em, st) IMPLIES
temp_em_filter(em, st) =
real_em_filter(em, confirm(st))
For the example pump, key1 is typically associated with the
ok function during data entry. The verification effort therefore
aims to ensure that, whenever key1 is enabled and associated
with function display ok, the confirmation action behaves in a
similar way in all data entry modes.
Proving the requirement: When attempting the proof in PVS,
a counter-example is found by the theorem prover. The use of the
confirmation key is not consistent in data entry mode “vtbi over
time.” This particular data entry mode involves setting vtbi and
time. The theorem fails because when vtbi has been entered, and
key1 is pressed with the ok function display, the pump value of
vtbi is not changed. It is only changed after the next step when
time has been changed. The failure, identified while proving
the theorem, may require further scrutiny to demonstrate that
the system’s safety is not affected. The device in fact assumes
that vtbi and rate are the standard mechanisms for setting up the
infusion rate. There may therefore be issues when a prescription
is received that presents vtbi and time.
F. Reversibility Template
Users may perform incorrect actions, and the device needs
to provide them with functions that allow them to recover by
reversing the effect of the incorrect action. In [41], it has been
shown that lack of compliance to this requirement could lead
to data entry errors. An example requirement based on this
template is as follows.
R9: Any data entry action should be reversible.
To facilitate the formalization process, this requirement can
be reformulated as follows: “For any particular action a1, there
is a reversing action a2 which returns the device to its origi-
nal state.” This reformulation can be easily translated into the
following generic formula:
data_entry_ready(st) IMPLIES
pump_variable(a2(a1(st))) =
pump_variable(st)
For the example pump, the formula needs to consider all
the chevron keys and entry of infusion rate, time and vtbi.
For the sake of clarity the example is given only for the case
of entering infusion rate and the single chevron up (sup) key
with inverse single chevron down (sdown) key. The example
pump is designed so that the user can accelerate the size of
the increment by holding the chevron key down. This possi-
bility is reflected in the specification but is simplified here for
illustration.
click_sdown(st: state): state =
release_sdown(sdown(st))
click_sup(st: state): state =
release_sup(sup(st))
The formulation for the other chevron keys and data entry
modes is identical. The generic version of the requirement is
therefore instantiated as follows:
rate_entry_ready(st) IMPLIES
infusion_rate(click_sdown(click_sup(st)))
= infusion_rate(st)
Proving the requirement: This final proof example further
shows how feedback from the theorem prover can be used
constructively to refine the understanding of the interaction
design of the device. Proof of the theorem fails, and the the-
orem prover returns counter-examples indicating anomalies for
certain specific values. An example counter-example identified
by the theorem prover occurs at 99.9: pressing sup and then
sdown produces 99 (instead of 99.9). This happens because of
“step boundaries” where the size of the increment or decrement
changes. Up to, but not including, 100, both the single chevron
up key and the single chevron down key make a step of 0.1.
From 100 upward (up to 1000), the increment is 1. Therefore,
to prove that sup can be reversed by sdown, the theorem must
take account of these step boundaries. The additional condi-
tions necessary to prove the theorem for the range 0 to 100 for
the sup and sdown keys are illustrated here. The first condition
ensures that the analysis is performed within a range of val-
ues where the same increment step (in this case, 0.1) is always
maintained:
infusion_rate(device(st)) >= 0 AND
infusion_rate(device(st)) + 0.1 < 100
A second condition is necessary to further restrict the do-
main of values considered in the proof to those handled by
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the device: numbers below 100 can have only one decimal
place:
infusion_rate(st) =
(floor(10 ∗ infusion_rate(st))/10) AND
infusion_rate(st) =
(ceil_rate(10 ∗ infusion_rate(st))/10)
where floor returns the largest integer less than or equal to the
specified number, and ceil returns the smallest integer greater
than or equal to the given number. Wrapping all these constraints
together, for all step boundaries, and for all chevron keys, the
property to be proved for requirement R9 becomes much more
complex. Proof of this requirement, with all its qualifications,
provides limited assurance that number entry actions are easily
reversible by users. Clearly the process was valuable in under-
standing the characteristics of the number entry system, and
identify precisely in the design space where the property fails.
Formulating and proving the theorem raised practical questions
about whether the data entry system of the device is acceptable,
or whether it is likely to lead to use error. It should be noted that
later releases of the firmware for this device have fixed these
issues with step boundaries.
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Demonstrating that the design of a medical device is com-
pliant to relevant safety and usability requirements is a serious
problem. The techniques described in this paper are designed to
address this issue. It is estimated that there were 56 000 adverse
event reports relating to infusion pumps between 2005 and 2009
in the United States including at least 500 deaths [42]. This has
resulted in 87 infusion pump recalls to address identified safety
concerns, according to FDA data. Of these adverse event re-
ports, use error has been a significant factor. The documentation
provided by manufacturers to regulators as a part of a safety
argument is usually substantial. The scale of the argument in-
evitably makes it difficult for regulators to comprehend them
and to be confident that the evidence provided is of satisfactory
quality. The use of formal techniques has advantages.
1) It is precise and concise, potentially avoiding the docu-
mentation explosion generated by a typical deposition.
2) Tools like model checkers and theorem provers enable
mechanical and exhaustive verification.
3) The use of simulation techniques combined with formal
modeling can clearly demonstrate how potential problems
are addressed that can be of value to regulators, human
factors and domain specialists.
There are well-known obstacles to the immediate take-up
of these facilities. They are not routinely part of a typical de-
veloper’s suite of tools. They are not routinely used in prod-
uct development. However there are signs of interest in these
techniques. For example, the FDA has developed generic PCA
models [43] using Simulink. It is not however a feasible op-
tion to expect regulators to construct models after the fact. An
ideal option would be that manufacturers produce models as part
of their design process demonstrating that a submitted product
adheres to safety requirements. The regulators would then use
tools to validate the models provided as part of the developer’s
submission.
We have used model checking combined with simulation to
support the process of validation of models by generating traces
to be validated on the device. However, manufacturers have ac-
cess to source code, and even if they do not develop their devices
using models, they can create faithful models systematically. A
further important issue, not addressed here, is how to validate
that the considered safety requirements correctly address the
usability and safety of the device for the context in which the
device is to be used. This problem is orthogonal to the tech-
niques presented in this paper. Safety aspects can be addressed
with a human factors emphasis using a hazard analysis such as
the one presented in [44].
We have illustrated how formalizing the requirements pro-
vides benefits in addition to the ability to prove them. It has led
to much more detailed thinking about the precise nature of the
requirements, both in general and for a specific device, than was
possible in the informal natural language version. The pragmatic
and informal combination of model checking and theorem prov-
ing provided powerful tools for analysis. By using each flexibly
for requirements they were suited to, rather than ideologically
favoring one for all requirements, or trying to combine them into
a single tool applying both, it was possible to prove the require-
ments with relatively low effort. One potential drawback of this
approach is the need to master the two verification techniques.
Indeed, both verification methods currently require significant
skills for analysis. However, we have observed recurrent patterns
in the structure of the formal models of devices from different
manufacturers, and in the strategies needed to complete verifi-
cation of several types of safety requirements. Therefore, there
are clear opportunities to create automated proof strategies that
can be used to reduce the analysis effort.
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